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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Kendall filed this appeal to challenge the constitutionality of Utah Code § 78B-3-
104 (the “bond statute”) and Utah Code § 63G-7-601 (the “undertaking statute”), which 
require the filing of a bond and an undertaking when bringing an action against a police 
officer or a government entity.  The issues were fully briefed by the parties in their briefs 
to the Court of Appeals, including the fact that this appeal is moot and that Kendall does 
not have standing to challenge the statutes.  The recall of this case by the Supreme Court 
has not remedied these deficiencies and the Court should dismiss the appeal.  To the extent 
the Court does consider the merits of this appeal, this Court should be guided by its prior 
decisions in Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78 (Utah 1981) and Snyder v. Cook, 688 P.2d 496 
(Utah 1984) that find the bond statute Kendall challenges in this action is constitutional on 
its face.  The conclusion this Court reached in Zamora and Snyder that the bond statute is 
constitutional as applied in usual and ordinary circumstances is correct.  The bond statute 
does not violate the open courts provision because it does not abrogate or impermissibly 
restrict access to the courts.  Likewise, the bond statute does not violate due process 
because it is reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose and it satisfies the notice 
and hearing requirements of a procedural due process analysis.  Kendall has not shown 
otherwise. 
Similarly, Kendall has not shown that the Court’s decisions in Zamora and Snyder 
are no longer sound because of changing conditions.  The bond statute was passed in 
recognition of the unique role of police officers in our society and the reality that this role 
exposes them to a greater risk of frivolous lawsuits.  This unique role of a police officer 
2 
has not changed since this statute was first passed and there is nothing to indicate that 
officers are subject to fewer frivolous actions now than they were seventy years ago.  The 
bond and undertaking statues do not violate constitutional rights and this Court should not 
depart from the conclusion it reached in Zamora and Snyder that the bond statute does not 
violate constitutional rights on its face. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS APPEAL IS MOOT AND KENDALL LACKS STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE STATUTES AT ISSUE. 
 
The recall of this case by the Supreme Court does not create a “material difference” 
in the arguments presented to the Court.  This Court’s Order on Supplemental Briefing 
states a supplemental brief should only be submitted “if the posture before the Supreme 
Court creates a material difference in the argument presented . . ..’”  As discussed at length 
in the City Defendants’1 Appellee Brief, the Court should decline to rule on the merits of 
this appeal because the issues raised are moot.  See Appellee Br. at 12-14.  Kendall also 
does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes.  The Supreme 
Court’s recall of this case does not remedy these deficiencies and the appeal should be 
dismissed. 
II. THE PRINCIPLES OF STARE DECISIS SHOW THE HOLDING IN 
ZAMORA SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. 
 
To the extent the Court elects to consider the merits of this appeal, the Court should 
                                                            
1  Defendants/Appellees Brett Olsen, Brian Purvis, Joseph Allen Everett, Tom 
Edmundson, George Pregman, and Salt Lake City Corporation are referred to collectively 
as the City Defendants. 
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not depart from the conclusion it reached in its prior decisions that the bond statute does 
not violate constitutional rights on its face.  “Stare decisis is ‘a cornerstone of Anglo-
American jurisprudence.’”  Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶¶ 9-10, No. 20140861, 
2017 WL 117356, at * 2 (Utah 2017)(quoting State v. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶ 33, 371 P.3d 
1).  “Any party asking a court to overturn prior precedent has a substantial burden of 
persuasion.”  ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65, ¶ 23, 245 P.3d 
184 (quotation marks omitted).  Thus, “[a] court will follow the rule of law which it has 
established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous 
or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will 
come by departing from precedent.”  Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
In Zamora this Court concluded the bond statute is constitutional as applied in usual 
and ordinary circumstances.  It recognized that the statute could operate to restrict access 
to the courts if applied to an individual that is impecunious, but found the statute 
constitutional because the language of the statute permits district courts flexibility in setting 
the amount of the bond to ensure individuals that are impecunious are not denied access to 
the courts.  The Court affirmed its holding in Synder.  The conclusion the Court reached is 
correct and Kendall has not shown that changing conditions warrant a departure from that 
conclusion. 
A. The Conclusion the Court Reached in Zamora is Correct. 
 
1. Zamora was Correctly Decided because the Statute does not Abrogate 
a Legal Remedy. 
The conclusion the Court reached in Zamora is correct because the bond statute does 
4 
not eliminate a legal remedy.  A necessary pre-requisite to every open courts challenge is 
that the statute at issue abrogate a legal remedy.  See e.g., Tindley, et al. v. Salt Lake City 
Sch. Dist., 2005 UT 30, ¶ 12-26, 116 P.3d 295.2  A statute abrogates a legal remedy if it 
“annul[s], cancel[s], repeal[s] or destroy[s]” a right to recovery.  Burgandy v. State Dep’t 
of Human Serv., 1999 UT App 208, ¶ 16, 983 P.2d 586 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 8 
(5th ed.1979), for its definition of “abrogate” and finding statute at issue did not violate 
open courts provision because it did not abrogate a claim).  If no claim is abrogated, no 
violation of the open courts provision can be shown.  Tindley, 2005 UT 30, ¶ 12-26 (finding 
statute did not violate open courts provision because it did not abrogate a claim).  The bond 
statute at issue in Zamora and this case is an attorney’s fees provision that imposes a bond 
requirement to ensure collection of fees and costs, if awarded.  It does not eliminate a legal 
remedy and, thus, does not violate the open courts provision.3  
This conclusion is consistent with other decisions of this Court that find similar 
statutes do not violate the open courts provision on their face.  For example, in Jensen v. 
State Tax Comm’n, 835 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah 1992), this Court considered a challenge to a 
statute that required taxpayers to deposit the full amount of assessed taxes, penalties, and 
                                                            
2  See also, Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d 436 (stating 
“the Berry test begins with the presumption that a legal remedy was abolished”). 
3  The fact Zamora was decided before the landmark decision in Berry, which sets 
forth the two-part test used to determine if a statute that abrogates a claim survives 
constitutional muster does not affect the correctness of the Court’s conclusion.  Courts only 
engage in a Berry analysis if the statute abrogates a claim.  Burgandy v. State Dep’t of 
Human Serv., 1999 UT App 208, ¶ 16, 983 P.2d 586 (stating Berry established a two-part 
test for analyzing open courts questions, but the “test applies only when a right is 
abrogated”); Wood, 2002 UT 134, ¶ 15(stating “the Berry test begins with the presumption 
that a legal remedy was abolished”). 
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interest with the Tax Commission before seeking appellate review.  The Court found that 
the statute was constitutional on its face, but it could operate to bar access to courts as 
applied to the facts of a particular case.  Id.  In that case, the appellants had failed to deposit 
the $340,000 they were deemed to owe in taxes, penalties and past due interest before 
bringing their appeal challenging that determination.  Id. at 968-69.  The Court excused the 
appellants from compliance with the statutory deposit requirement because the appellants 
did not have the funds and it would have been unconstitutional to impose the deposit 
requirement in that case.  Id. at 969.  However, the Court made clear that the statute was 
not unconstitutional on its face and that if a taxpayer could meet the deposit requirement, 
they were required to do so.  Id.  (stating “the statutory requirement is not unconstitutional 
in all cases.  When a taxpayer is able to meet the requirement, the deposit must be paid”).  
Like the Court in Jensen, the Court in Zamora found the bond statute constitutional 
on its face, but that it could operate to prevent access to the courts if applied to an individual 
that was unable to afford the bond.  Zamora, 635 P.2d at 80.  The Court found that this 
concern is resolved by the fact that courts have the ability to conduct preliminary 
procedures to determine whether a plaintiff is impecunious and able to afford the bond and 
the language of the statute contemplates such flexibility.  Id. at 80-81.  The Court’s 
conclusion is consistent with several cannons of statutory construction.  For example, 
statutes should be read in harmony and not in conflict with other relevant statutory 
provisions.4  In Zamora, the Court read the language of the bond statute in conjunction 
                                                            
4  Foutz v. City of S. Jordan, 2004 UT 75, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d 1171 (“We read the plain 
language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other 
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with other statutory provisions that give courts the ability to hold preliminary procedures 
to determine if a plaintiff is impecunious and can afford a statutorily imposed fee.  Id. at 
80-82.  The Court’s conclusion is also consistent with the principles of statutory 
construction that direct courts to interpret statutes to avoid absurd results5 and to presume 
statutes are constitutional and to resolve any doubts in favor of constitutionality.6 
Finally, the Court may disregard the claim that the bond statute is unconstitutional 
on its face because it discourages people that are not impecunious from bringing claims 
                                                            
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.”); Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 47, ¶ 9, 234 
P.3d 1147, 1150 (“[O]ur plain language analysis is not so limited that we only inquire into 
individual words and subsections in isolation; our interpretation of a statute requires that 
each part or section be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to 
produce a harmonious whole.  Moreover, the purpose of the statute has an influence on the 
plain meaning of a statute.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
5  State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 11, 165 P.3d 1206 (stating a “well-settled caveat 
to the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language of a 
statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result”) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted); Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 70 n.23, 267 P.3d 863, 
879 n.23 (“When statutory language . . . presents the court with two alternative readings, 
we prefer the reading that avoids absurd results.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
6  Tindley, 2005 UT 30, ¶ 11 (stating “the challenged statute is presumed 
constitutional, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality”); State 
v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ¶ 7, 245 P.3d 745 (stating the Court is “guided by the well-settled 
proposition that all statutes are presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging a 
statute bears the burden of proving its invalidity”). 
Kendall’s contention that this principle of statutory construction does not apply 
when a party challenges a statute under the open courts provision is incorrect.  The 
authority Kendall relies on has been superseded by more recent majority decisions of this 
Court.  See e.g., Tindley., 2005 UT 30, ¶ 11(stating in the context of an open courts 
challenge that the statute “is presumed constitutional, and we resolve any reasonable doubts 
in favor of constitutionality”); Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 135 (where the 
majority recognized “an obligation of deference to legislative judgments in a Berry review” 
and stated that “to the extent this differs from our prior application of Berry, those prior 
applications are disavowed”); Id. ¶ 42 (C.J. Durham dissenting) (noting the majority 
afforded a presumption of validity to the statute in considering the appellant’s open courts 
challenge, disavowing the holding in Wood that Kendall relies on). 
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because of the financial risks involved.7  This does not show an elimination of a legal 
remedy.  There are financial risks and obligations associated with engaging in any 
litigation, including costs of discovery, expert fees, and payment of an attorney to pursue 
the claim.  In some cases these financial risks and obligations also include a statutory or 
contractual award of attorney fees to the prevailing party8 and in all cases they include an 
award of costs to the prevailing party.9  Whenever a person decides to pursue a legal claim 
they necessarily assume these financial obligations.  The fact that pursuing litigation 
necessarily requires the expenditure of funds and the risk of an adverse judgment does not 
                                                            
7  See Kendall’s Suppl. Br., at 6-7 & 10.  
8  See e.g., Utah Code § 63G-20-204 (awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing party 
in an action brought against government entity relating to the provisions of the Religious 
Protections in Relation to Marriage, Family, or Sexuality Act); Utah Code § 11-39-106 
(awarding attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in an action brought against a local entity 
to enforce the provision of the Act on Building Improvements and Public Works Projects); 
Utah Code § 78B-5-826 (awarding costs and attorneys’ fees to prevailing party when the 
provisions of a promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party 
to recover attorneys’ fees); Utah Code § 78b-11-126 (awarding attorneys’ fees to the 
prevailing party in an action brought under Utah Uniform Arbitration Act); Utah Code § 
30-3-3 (stating “court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, 
including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or 
defend the action” in actions to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case); Utah Code § 57-16-8 (awarding 
attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in eviction proceedings brought under the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1988 (permitting award of attorneys’ fees to the 
prevailing party in an action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983); Thorpe v. Ancell, 367 
F. App’x 914, 924 (10th Cir. 2010) (affirming the lower court’s award of attorneys’ fees 
to police officers in § 1983 case); United States v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 172 F.3d 
1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the Oil Pollution Act to permit the government to 
recover attorneys’ fees); United States v. Chapman, 146 F.3d 1166, 1175 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(interpreting CERCLA to permit the government, as the prevailing party, to recover 
attorneys’ fees). 
9  UTAH RULE CIV. P. 54(d)(1) (awarding costs other than attorney’s fees to 
prevailing party, unless a rule or statute specifically provides otherwise); FED. R. CIV. P. 
54(d)(1) (awarding costs to the prevailing party on the same grounds as the state rule)   
8 
show an abrogation of a legal remedy.10  Kendall has not shown the Court’s holding in 
Zamora was clearly erroneous11 and the Court should not depart from the conclusion it 
reached in that case that the bond statute is constitutional and does not violate the open 
courts clause on its face. 
2. Zamora was Correctly Decided because the Bond Statute does not 
Violate Due Process. 
Kendall argues Zamora was incorrectly decided because it does not discuss whether 
the statute violates due process.  This argument is not compelling.  The Zamora decision 
does not contain any specific discussion of whether the bond statute violates due process 
because the plaintiff did not challenge the statute on those grounds.12  But this does not 
show that the conclusion the Court reached in Zamora is wrong.  As set forth at length in 
the City Defendants’ Appellee Brief, neither the bond nor the undertaking statute violate 
                                                            
10  Kendall’s citation to choice quotes from fact witnesses he called at an evidentiary 
hearing set to determine if he was impecunious and required to pay a bond does not show 
the bond or undertaking statutes abrogate a claim.  See Kendall’s Suppl. Br., at 6, n.6.  
Whether a statute abrogates a claim is a question of law.  See, e.g., Tindley, 2005 UT 30, 
¶¶12-26; Wood, 2002 UT 134, ¶¶ 9-15.  It is the role of this Court, not fact witnesses at an 
evidentiary hearing, to resolve that question. 
11  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (citing 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“Before overturning a long-settled 
precedent, however, we require ‘special justification,’ not just an argument that the 
precedent was wrongly decided.”); Bank of Am, 2017 WL 117356, at *2-3 (declining to 
depart from prior precedent where plaintiff did not mention the applicable standard, and 
failed to offer an arguments to explain why the Court’s decision was either originally 
erroneous or no longer sound); ASC Utah, 2010 UT 65, ¶ 24 (recognizing the plaintiff was 
not alleging the Court’s decision was “no longer sound because of changing conditions, 
but “simply that the rule was originally wrong and should be abandoned” and finding the 
plaintiff did not satisfy his burden of persuasion). 
12  Notably, the decision in Zamora is instructive to the due process analysis because 
it identifies the purpose of the bond statute and shows that it is rationally related to a 
legitimate legislative purpose.  
9 
due process because the statutes are reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose13 and 
they satisfy the notice and hearing requirements of a procedural due process analysis.  
Rather than repeat arguments on issues that have been fully briefed, the City Defendants 
refer the Court to their Appellee Brief for further discussion on this point. 
B. Kendall has not Shown Changing Conditions Warrant a Departure 
from this Court’s Holding in Zamora. 
Kendall has not shown that this Court’s holding in Zamora that the bond statute is 
constitutional is no longer sound because of changing conditions.  The bond statute was 
first passed in 1951.  See 1951 Ch. 58, § 1, enacting Utah Code § 104-11-16 (1951) (first 
version of the bond statute).  As set forth in Zamora, the statute was passed in recognition 
of the unique role of police officers in our society and the reality that this role exposes them 
to a greater risk of frivolous lawsuits: 
[P]eace officers are in an especially hazardous calling rendering a service 
essential to public safety and welfare. While it is the privilege of most of us 
to steer clear of situations where there is violence and danger, it is the sworn 
duty of peace officers to go into such situations. Without extenuating thereon, 
this exposes them to the possibility of becoming involved therein and of 
incurring animosities of those engaged in such troubles, with the consequent 
risks of lawsuits which may emanate therefrom. 
 
Because of what has just been said, we see nothing inherently unreasonable 
                                                            
13  Kendall argues heightened scrutiny applies to the substantive due process claim 
in this case.  Kendall failed to timely include arguments on this point in his briefing to the 
Utah Court of Appeals.  See City Defendants’ Appellee Br., at 28, n.3.  This Court’s Order 
on Supplemental Briefing makes clear that supplemental briefing may not be used to 
remedy deficiencies in prior briefing.  Suppl. Briefing Order (“[T]his order shall not be 
construed to excuse compliance with otherwise-applicable principles or rules of appellate 
review, (e.g. preservation in the trial court).”)  Regardless, Kendall’s assertion that a 
heightened standard of review applies is incorrect.  As set forth in a recent decision by this 
Court, a rational basis standard of review applies in a case like this where no claim is 
abrogated.  See City Defendants’ Appellee Br. at 28 citing Tindley, 2005 UT 30, ¶ 29. 
10 
in the legislature viewing it as within the police power of the sovereign, in 
the interest of maintaining the peace and good order of society, to provide 
this measure of protection to that class of officers who are willing to 
undertake that hazardous responsibility. 
 
Zamora, 635 P.2d at 80 (footnotes omitted). 
This unique role of a police officer has not changed and there is nothing to indicate 
that officers are subject to fewer frivolous actions now than they were sixty-five years ago.  
Indeed, the proliferation in litigation nationwide suggests the opposite.  Indeed, this case 
is a classic example of the type of overzealous litigation that can result.  Kendall has filed 
a smorgasbord of state law claims against five different officers and the City for the actions 
of those officers.  As demonstrated by the motions currently on file with the United States 
District Court, most (if not all) of those claims are precluded and are also duplicative of 
Kendall’s federal and state constitutional claims.  The City Attorney’s Office has spent 
time preparing motions to dispose of those claims, when a quick review of the law 
demonstrates these claims fall within the parameters of the Governmental Immunity Act 
of Utah and are excluded by the public duty doctrine.  Requiring a bond serves the purpose 
of requiring a plaintiff and their attorney to appropriately research claims before bringing 
them and ensures the party defending against such claims is able to collect, at least in part, 
the attorneys’ fees and costs they are entitled to receive by statute when they prevail on 
such claims.14 
                                                            
14  Notably, the United States District Court recently entered judgment for the City 
Defendants on all Kendall’s federal law claims.  This will be dispositive of most, if not all, 
Kendall’s state law claims.  See Dkt. 74, Kendall v. Olsen et. al., United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, Case No. 2:15-cv-00862-RJS. 
Kendall argues he has experienced delay and expense in this matter as a result of 
the bond and undertaking statutes. Claimed delay and expense do not show the statutes are 
no longer sound because of changing conditions. Moreover, any delay or additional 
expense Kendall experienced in this matter was a direct result of Kendall's decision to 
challenge the constitutionality of the bond and undertaking statutes in a separate action, 
rather than simply pursuing his claims against the City Defendants. Similarly, it is 
incorrect to claim that the statute results in gross injustices because claims are dismissed 
without being heard on the merits. When claims are dismissed for a failure to file a 
necessary bond or undertaking they are dismissed without prejudice. 15 The plaintiff is free 
to re-file the claim with the necessary bond or undertaking. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should decline to hear this appeal because the issue is moot and Kendall 
does not have standing to challenge the statutes at issue. Moreover, the statutes do riot 
violate constitutional rights for the reasons set forth in the City Defendants' brief and the 
Court should not depart from the conclusion it reached in Zamora that the bond statute is 
constitutional on its face. 
DATED this 2Pt day of February, 2017. 
8~ 
Attorney. for Defendants/ Appellees 
15 See, e.g., Rippstein v. City of Provo, 929 'F.2d 576, 578 (lOth Cir. ·1991) (''the 
appropriate remedy for failure to make a tiiiiely filing of an undertaking under section 63-
30-19 is dismissal Without prejudice."); Mglej v. Garfield County, No.2: 13-CV-713, 2014 
WL 2967605, at *2 (D. Utah July 1, 2014) (stating "Utah case law is clear that undertakings 
and bonds must be filed contemporaneously with the filing of the· complaint" and that 
"failure to post an undertaking and bond necessitates dismissal without prejl.1dice"). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2Pt dayofFebruary, 2017, a true and correct copy of 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF API1ELLEES ·was served, via U.S. Mail, postage pre-
paid, to the following: 
Ross C. "Rocky" Anderson 
LEWIS HANSEN, LLC 
The Judge Building 
Eight East Broadway, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Joshua D. Davidson 
Philip S. Lott 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
--I--U~~ATT-¥.:#~S32J-1- ------. 
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